Dec 122017
 

Brunei Revolt

Cpl Costello ( Centre ) was mentioned in Dispatches during the liberation of Bekenu

1st Green Jackets (43rd & 52nd) involvement

Brunei on occasions called the Venice and the Vienna of South East Asia, lies 275 miles north of the equator on the north-west coast of Borneo.  The total area of the country is 2,200 square miles of which 75% is covered with tropical rainforest: on the coastal belt mangrove and nipah palm swamp forests are interspersed with areas of cultivation which extend up the alluvial river valleys to the interior. 

In the 1960s Brunei was a British Protectorate, ruled by the Sultan, Sir Omar ali Saifuddin, the dynasty had ruled Brunei for over 600 years.  Oil had been discovered in the 1930s and the sultanate enjoyed the wealth generated by Brunei Shell.

The Brunei Revolt and Indonesian Confrontation which followed, had their origins in Indonesian opposition to plans to create a Malaysian Federation and Indonesian aspirations for a Greater Indonesia.  The Federation of Malaysia aimed to unite the mainly Malay-populated states of the Malayan Peninsula with the former British colonies of Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo.  In order to destabilise the process, Indonesia supplied and supported the Brunei left wing militia, the North Kalimantan National Army (TNKU) which favoured a North Borneo Federation.  The TNKU aim was to overthrow the Sultan of Brunei and unite the whole of Borneo under Indonesian rule.

By 1962 the strength of the TNKU was estimated to be 4,000 and the revolt in Brunei began on 8 December with rebel attacks in Brunei Town on the police station, power station and HM The Sultan’s palace.  The attacks on the police station and the Sultan’s palace were repelled but at Seria, Tutong, Limbang and Bangar the rebels were successful and assumed control as well as taking hostages, many of whom were European.

On 9 Dec 1962 the 1st Green Jackets (43rd and 52nd) under the command of Lieutenant Colonel ‘Tod’ Sweeney MC (a veteran of the 1944 D Day Pegasus Bridge coup de main operation), stationed at the time in Penang, were warned to move to Singapore either for internal security duties there or to be prepared for a move to Brunei.  The battalion covered the 450 miles overland to Singapore to 34 hrs and was embarked on HMS Tiger.  Late the same night, with the ship sailing at 28 knots towards Labuan, fresh orders came through. The ship was to divert to Miri, in Sarawak’s 4th Division and about 60 miles South of Brunei.  

The Battalion was to come under command of 99th Gurkha Infantry Brigade and was to land two companies (Letters ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies) and a Tactical Headquarters at dawn at Miri to deal with the rebels in the area.  At dawn the disembarkation began.  Captain Robin Evelegh (later Colonel and one of the ‘founding fathers’ of the Soldiers of Oxfordshire Museum) went ashore in a launch, with half-a-dozen men from the Reconnaissance Platoon, to check that Miri was clear of rebels and safe.  Expecting perhaps to be shot at as he landed on the beach about a mile from the centre of Miri town, he was met by a reception party consisting of the Mayor of Miri and the wife of the British Resident. There too was the Regiment’s charwallah from Penang; the intelligence and communications system of that great family of loyal camp-followers over the generations continues to be a matter of amazement!

With Miri still loyal the two rifle companies were landed.  There they learned that the town of Bekenu on the Sibuti River, was reported to be in rebel hands and there was also uncertainty as to the situation in Niah.  Bekenu is a police and administrative post ten miles up the Sibuti River, some twenty-five miles South-West of Miri and five miles from the coast.  Niah is a smaller post some forty miles South-West of Miri on the Niah River.

Dealing with the Niah situation proved to be relatively straightforward, the task being given to Letter C Company under Maj Mark Pennell.  The practice of headhunting by the indigenous Iban tribes had been banned by the British authorities in Sarawak but orders were now given that this ban be temporarily lifted.  Soon after, the Ibans decorated their canoes with bright red feathers – a clear sign of their intent to take heads – and set off up river towards Niah.  By the time that Letter C Company arrived in Niah, also by river, no rebel forces were to be found; hearing of the Iban headhunting parties’ imminent arrival, they had melted away into the jungle, never to be heard of again!  Credit should also be given to a Rhodesian surveyor who had organized a Niah village ‘home guard’ armed with shotguns.

The CO tasked Letter B Company under the command of Maj David Mostyn (later General Sir David Mostyn KCB CBE) to liberate Bekenu.  After a difficult overnight approach on foot, Letter B Company reached the outskirts of Bekenu early on 13 Dec.  In his own account of the operation Maj Mostyn said “At 1700 on 12 Dec the company was complete at Tanjong Batu and set off across country with a local guide.  The first mile, through mangrove and paddy, was appalling.  During a halt we heard that the only bridge over a stream was held by the rebels so, as surprise was essential I decided to take a longer circuitous route.  We pressed on through thick jungle and swamp, crossed a small river using native dugout canoes, and eventually reached the pepper garden just West of Bekenu.  The last half mile of this journey was along a tree trunk path laid above a swamp.  By now it was 0930 on 13 Dec and the approach had taken 16 hours.”

With three platoons engaged in a brief firefight the rebels fled downriver where they were ambushed by a further Green Jackets platoon in a launch and concealed on the riverbank.   6 rebels were killed in Bekenu, 6 captured and about 10 escaped into the jungle.  For the next 3-4 days patrols went up and down the river searching for escaped rebels but the operation to secure Bekenu had been a resounding success.

In this insurrection the majority of the population of Brunei remained loyal to the Sultan and by end of December 1962 the revolt was effectively over although the 1st Green Jackets did not leave Brunei until March 1963.  Subsequently the battalion served 2 four month operational tours in Borneo during the Confrontation with Indonesia.

Credited to the Soldiers of Oxford Museum
 
The Brunei revolt (Malay: Pemberontakan Brunei) was a December 1962 insurrection in the British protectorate of Brunei by opponents of its monarchy and its proposed inclusion in the Federation of Malaysia. The insurgents were members of the TNKU (North Kalimantan National Army), a militia supplied by Indonesia and linked to leftwing Brunei People’s Party (BPP) which favoured a North Borneo Federation. The TKNU began co-ordinated attacks on the oil town of Seria (targeting the Royal Dutch Shell oil installations) and on police stations and government facilities around the protectorate. The revolt began to break down within hours, having failed to achieve key objectives such as the capture of Brunei town and Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III. The revolt influenced the Sultan’s 1963 decision not to join Malaysia. It is seen as one of the first stages of the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation.

Background

The northern part of the island of Borneo was composed of three British territories: the colonies of Sarawak and North Borneo (to be renamed Sabah) and the protectorate of the Sultanate of Brunei. Brunei became a British protectorate in 1888, had an area of about 2,226 square miles (5,800 km2) and some 85,000 people, just over half Malays, a quarter Chinese and the rest Dayaks, the indigenous people of Borneo. Oil was discovered in 1929 near Seria and the Shell Petroleum Company concession provided the Sultanate with a huge income. The capital, called Brunei Town in those days, was on a river some 10 miles (20 km) from the coast.

In 1959, the Sultan, Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin III, established a legislature with half its members nominated and half elected. Elections were held in September 1962 and all of the contested seats were won by the Brunei People’s Party.

Between 1959 and 1962, the United Kingdom, Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak were involved in negotiations to form a new Malaysian Federation. However, the Philippines and particularly Indonesia opposed any move towards unification of North Borneo and Sarawak with the new federation. This support was given strength by evidence of widespread anti-Federation sentiment in Sarawak and Brunei itself. The Brunei People’s Party was in favour of joining Malaysia on condition it was as the unified three territories of northern Borneo (total about 1.5 million people, half Dayak) with their own sultan, and hence be strong enough to resist domination by Malaya or Singapore, Malay administrators or Chinese merchants. Local opposition and sentiments against the Malaysian Federation plan have often been under-represented in historical writings on the Brunei Rebellion and the subsequent Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation. In fact, political forces in Sarawak had long anticipated their own national independence as promised (but later aborted) by the last White Rajah of Sarawak, Charles Vyner Brooke, in 1941.

The North Kalimantan (or Kalimantan Utara) proposal was seen as a post-decolonisation alternative by local opposition against the Malaysian Federation plan. Local opposition throughout the Borneo territories was primarily based on economic, political, historical and cultural differences between the Borneo states and the Malayan peninsula, and an unwillingness to be subjected to peninsular political domination.

However, before the Brunei People’s Party electoral success, a military wing had emerged, the North Kalimantan National Army (Malay abbreviation TNKU), which saw itself as an anti-colonialist liberation party. Its sympathies lay with Indonesia which was seen as having better ‘liberationist’ credentials than Malaya and Singapore. Its 34-year-old leader A.M. Azahari had lived in Indonesia and was in touch with Indonesian intelligence agents. He had recruited several officers who had been trained in clandestine warfare in Indonesia. By late 1962, they could muster about 4000 men, a few modern weapons and about 1000 shotguns.

Prelude

Hints of brewing trouble came in early November 1962 when the Resident for the 5th Division of Sarawak, Richard Morris (an Australian), who was based in Limbang (sandwiched between the two parts of Brunei) received information. Special Branch police from Kuching visited Limbang but only found some illegal uniforms with TNKU badges. Later in November, Morris heard that an insurrection was planned for Brunei, but not before 19 December. Claude Fenner, the Inspector General of the Malayan Police flew to Sarawak to investigate but found no evidence. However, the Chief of Staff in the British Far East Headquarters in Singapore did review and update the contingency plan, PALE ALE, for Brunei. However, the risk was assessed as low and the British Far East Land, Sea and Air Commanders-in-Chief were away from Singapore as was the operational commander of land forces, Major General Walter Walker.

On 6 December, Morris heard the rebellion would start on the 8th. On 7th, similar information reached John Fisher, the resident of the 4th Division of Sarawak, based in Miri some 20 miles (30 km) west of Brunei. As a result, police were put on full alert through Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak, and Police Field Force reinforcements were flown from Kuching to Miri.

Contrary to popular belief, no firm evidence has ever been unearthed to support claims that the Indonesian President, Sukarno, had territorial ambitions over Sarawak (he always held firmly to the 1945 decision which delineated Indonesia’s boundaries to territories inherited from the former Dutch-Indies, and this might explain why he eagerly pursued Papua’s–but not East Timor’s–annexation). More likely was that Sukarno invested hopes for the establishment of a North Kalimantan state aligned to Jakarta’s anti-colonial/imperialist geopolitics, in which he found suitable allies.

In effort to thwart any effort to form Malaysia, Indonesia became actively involved in subterfuge operations and later declared war on Malaysia. During this period, Indonesian agents came into contact with local opposition that was against the idea of a federation.

Battle
First ten days

The rebellion broke out at 2:00 am on 8 December. Signals from Brunei to British Far East Headquarters reported rebel attacks on police stations, the Sultan’s Istana, the Prime Minister’s house and the power station, and that another rebel force was approaching the capital by water. Far East Headquarters ordered ALE YELLOW, which placed a force of two Gurkha infantry companies on 48 hours notice to move.

Most of the attacks in Brunei town were repulsed although the electricity supply was cut off. At this stage it was not known that rebels had attacked police stations throughout Brunei, in the 5th Division of Sarawak and on the western edge of North Borneo. Miri was still in government hands but Limbang had been taken by the rebels. The situation was most serious in Seria where the rebels had captured the police station and were dominating the oilfields.

Nine hours after ALE YELLOW, ALE RED was ordered and two companies of 1st Battalion, 2nd Gurkha Rifles, of 99th Infantry Brigade, moved to the RAF airfields at Changi and Seletar in Singapore to fly to Labuan Island in Brunei Bay. The Gurkhas’ embarkation went slowly because the RAF was unprepared and following normal peacetime procedures. The troops were in a Bristol Britannia and three Blackburn Beverleys and the latter were diverted in flight from Labuan to Brunei airfield when it was learned that this was not in rebel hands.

The Beverleys landed at about 10:00 pm and the Gurkhas advanced into Brunei. They fought a series of actions, suffering six casualties, two fatal. A small group of Gurkhas led by Captain Digby Willoughby rescued the Sultan and took him to police headquarters. An advance to Seria met strong opposition and returned to Brunei to counter a rebel threat to its centre and the airfield.

On 9 December, John Fisher called on the Dayak tribes for help by sending a boat with the traditional Red Feather of War up the Baram River. Tom Harrisson, the Curator of the Sarawak Museum in Kuching and leader of resistance to the Japanese in the Second World War also arrived in Brunei. He summoned the Kelabits from the highlands around Bario in the 5th Division, the centre of his wartime resistance. Hundreds of Dayaks responded, and formed into companies led by British civilians all commanded by Harrison. This force reached some 2,000 strong, and with excellent knowledge of the tracks through the interior (there were no roads), helped contain the rebels and cut off their escape route to Indonesia.

Meanwhile, reinforcements flowed into Labuan. The 2nd Gurkhas were brought up to battalion strength. On 10 December, the Far East ‘spearhead battalion’, the Queen’s Own Highlanders began arriving in Brunei. Brigadier Patterson, commander 99th Gurkha Infantry Brigade arrived to take overall command from Brigadier Pat Glennie, normally the Brigadier General Staff at Far East HQ. Both reported to Lieutenant General Sir Nigel Poett, the Far East Land Forces Commander in Singapore. Seria and Limbang remained in rebel hands. Further reinforcements arrived in the following days. These enabled Seria and Limbang to be recaptured.

By 17 December, the rebellion had been held and broken. Some 40 rebels were dead and 3,400 captured. The remainder had fled and were assumed to be trying to reach Indonesia. Of the leaders, Azahari was in the Philippines and Yassin Affendi was with the fugitives.

Seria

The road route to Seria was judged too vulnerable to ambush and there were no naval resources for a move by sea. Reconnaissance by an Army Air Corps Beaver revealed rebel flags over the Shell complex, and the 6 miles (10 km) of coast seemed in rebel hands. However, there appeared to be a potential landing site for light aircraft west of Seria and east of the town – the runway at Anduki Airfield had been cleared by a small group of western civilians who had managed to escape the rebels. One escapee, Hugh McDonald, a shell contractor and WWII veteran, made contact with Singapore installations to confirm a safe landing. On 10 December, a company of the Queen’s Own Highlanders boarded five Twin Pioneers and a Beverley at Brunei. The Twin Pioneers landed west of Seria and the Beverley at Anduki. A police station 2 miles (3 km) from the western landing was recaptured and so was the Telecommunications Centre after a brief fight. Anduki airfield was quickly recaptured. However, the main Seria police station, with 48 hostages, most Shell expatriates, was not secured until the 12th.

Anduki Airfield is today a grass airstrip with a concrete ramp used almost exclusively by Brunei Shell Petroleum aircraft and helicopters servicing Brunei’s extensive offshore petroleum production installations. The Sultan of Brunei and members of the Royal Family sometimes use it in their helicopters when they wish to visit Seria, especially on State occasions. Regarded as strategically important because of its proximity to the oil town of Seria, its history in the Brunei Revolt and the paucity of other Brunei airstrips usable by fixed-wing military aircraft, Anduki and the adjacent highway to Bandar Seri Begawan is one of the first areas to be secured by Gurkha and Brunei Army troops when they deploy on contemporary war exercises.

Executions at Temburong

On 8 December 1962, from two till five in the morning, shots could be heard near police stations all over Brunei. According to news received from Temburong, the District Officer Pengiran Haji Besar bin Pengiran Haji Kula and a few others from Brunei security forces and a number of civilians were executed for refusing to join in the rebellion.

By five in the morning, TNKU already managed to control Pekan Besar. More news came out that a number of civil servants at Pekan Besar had managed to escape capture. Around an hour later at downtown, the Deputy Chief Minister was granted audience by the Sultan. After the meeting, the Sultan made a radio declaration condemning TNKU, the armed wing of the Brunei People’s Party, for treason.

The assault on Limbang
Limbang raid

In Limbang, rebels attacked the local police station, killing five local policemen. The rebels then obtained the surrender of British official R.H. Morris, his wife, four other Europeans and an American Peace Corps worker, and took the remaining police officers hostage. On the first night of their captivity, they were crowded into the police cells, the second night they were moved to the local hospital where they overheard the rebels planning their hangings the following day.

Eighty-nine Marines of 42 Commando had arrived in Brunei on 11 December, led by Captain Jeremy Moore (who later commanded the British Forces during the Falklands War). After acquiring two landing craft, the Marines were transported to Limbang by Royal Navy crews led by Captain Black (who later commanded HMS Invincible during the Falklands War) and staged their arrival at dawn, 13 December. The landing craft had manually operated ramps which took too long to lower and the senior officer took the decision that the Marines would vault over the sides or over the ramps under covering fire from Vickers machine guns mounted on the bridges. One landing craft’s bridge was raked with Bren gun fire, disabling the crew, and the craft rammed into the river bank and quay.

It is worth noting that the only map they had was 10 years old at the time. The Marines lost the element of surprise due to the loud noise of their boats, but succeeded nevertheless in suppressing the rebels’ machine guns and landed.

The attackers started their search for the hostages who, on hearing shots, began singing the American song “She’ll Be Coming ‘Round the Mountain”, allowing the first rescue party to quickly locate them. The first rescue party was attacked and two of the three Marines were killed. A second rescue party fought off the rebels from around the hospital and freed the hostages. About 200 rebels, who had little if any military training and a paltry assortment of weapons (about a dozen Bren guns and Lee–Enfield rifles, but mainly shotguns, muskets and daggers), tried to resist, but were beaten back.

Five Marines were killed and eight wounded in the attack. British sources do not list rebel losses in this incident, but Clodfelter estimates losses in the Brunei Rebellion as 40 rebels and six Marines.

There is a memorial to all the dead in Limbang. The leader of the Limbang rebels was caught and tried and received an eleven-year prison sentence. He lives (2007) on the outskirts of Limbang.

Mopping up

By 17 December 42 Commando was complete in Brunei and 1st Green Jackets (43rd and 52nd) had landed from the cruiser HMS Tiger in Miri. 40 Commando aboard the commando carrier HMS Albion was diverted from Miri to Kuching. On 14 December, most of the unit reinforced the artillery battery sent there as infantry on 12 December to pre-empt trouble from the Chinese of the Clandestine Communist Organisation (CCO) who were openly sympathetic to the Brunei rebels. The last company of 40 Commando landed near Seria. Albion also provided helicopters from the embarked Naval Air Commando squadrons.

Major General Walter Walker took over as COMBRITBOR and Director of Operations (DOBOPS) on 19 December with command of all land, sea and air forces assigned to Borneo and reporting directly to the Commander-in-Chief Far East Forces, Admiral Sir David Luce. Three weeks after the rebellion started, 99th Gurkha Infantry Brigade had 5 infantry battalions and HQ 3rd Command Brigade was in Kuching. This force was supported by the Brunei Malay Regiment, the Sarawak Rangers, police of the three territories including paramilitary Police Field Force, and Harrison’s force of now 4,000 Dayaks. Suitable coastal patrol naval vessels were lacking (the Royal Navy didn’t have any) so minesweepers were used. The RAF had medium and short range transport aircraft. In January, the Queen’s Own Highlanders and 1/2 Gurkhas were replaced by the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry and 1/7 Gurkhas and special forces troops had also arrived.

Mopping up operations, by this time including a commando artillery battery with their guns, continued until May 1963. On 18 May, a patrol of 1/7 Gurkhas were guided by an informer to a camp in the mangrove. They flushed a party of rebels towards an ambush. Ten rebels were killed or captured. They were the remnants of TNKU headquarters and one of the wounded, shot in the hip, was Yassin Affendi.

However, on 12 April, the police station at Tebedu in the 1st Division of Sarawak was attacked and captured. The attackers had come from Kalimantan. This marked the beginning of Confrontation.

Aftermath

The rebellion also played a role in the Sultan of Brunei’s subsequent decision for Brunei to not join the Federation of Malaysia.

Order of Battle

The following units, or significant elements of them, deployed to Borneo in response to the rebellion before May 1963:

40 Commando Royal Marines

42 Commando Royal Marines

Queen’s Royal Irish Hussars

29th Commando Light Regiment Royal Artillery

Queen’s Own Highlanders

King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry

1st Green Jackets (43rd and 52nd)

22 Special Air Service

1st/2nd Gurkhas

1st/7th Gurkhas

Sourced from Wikipedia